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Abstract 
This paper examines the nature and impacts of two information intervention radio programmes broadcast on Radio 
Okapi—the radio service of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A matched randomization technique 
was used to assign Rwandan Hutus and Congolese autochthons in South Kivu to listen to either of the two programmes 
within their naturalistic contexts for 13 months. At the end of the treatment, participants’ perceptions of barriers to 
peace; descriptive and prescriptive interventions; victimhood and villainity; opportunities for personal development 
and civic engagement; and knowledge of repatriation processes were assessed in 16 focus groups across four contexts. 
The study concludes that international media intervention programmes that provide robust information and a platform 
for objective analyses within a multiple narrative and participatory framework can enhance greater engagement with 
nascent democratic reforms, positive perception of long term opportunities for personal development and empathy 
with the ethnic Other. 
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1. Introduction 
The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) of-
ficially ended in 2002, but it has remained one of the 
world’s worst humanitarian crises. 5.4 million people 
have died from war–related causes since 1998 (IRC, 
2008), representing about 10% of the country’s popu-
lation, and two million people have been displaced 
(UNHCR, 2009). The involvement of combatants from 
neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda makes the 
DRC conflict highly complex and intractable (Afoaku, 
2002; Autesserre, 2006; Crises Group, 2009; Feeley & 
Thomas-Jensen, 2008; Nest, Francois, & Kisangani, 
2006; Prunier, 2009; Swarbrick, 2004; Thakur, 2007; 
Turner, 2007).  
Though the Rwandan conflict itself ended in 1994, 
it continued in the DRC when the Hutu genocidaires 
along with millions of Rwandan refugees crossed the 
border into the DRC. Despite the presence of some 
20,000 UN peacekeepers, Rwandan Hutu militants con-
tinue to operate in the eastern region of the DRC prin-
cipally under the banner of Forces Démocratiques pour 
la Libération du Rwanda or Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). There has also been the 
Rwandan Tutsi-led M23 armed group operating in 
North Kivu province. The UN Mission in the DRC (MO-
NUC)1 is one of the world’s largest UN Missions and the 
                                                          
1 On May 28 2010 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
1925 (2010) to extend the mandate of MONUC. Effective July 1 
2010, Resolution 1925, renamed the Mission as the United Na-
tions Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO). Still act-
ing under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MONUSCO places 
more emphasis on supporting and stabilising the DRC’s mili-
tary, law enforcement and justice institutions and consolidat-
ing the peace. Throughout this paper however, the old acro-
nym MONUC is used to refer to the UN Mission in the DRC. 
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most expensive. An essential element of MONUC’s 
Public Information Operations (PIO) is Radio Okapi. Ra-
dio is easily accessible and is a very popular medium in 
the DRC. A rich oral tradition, low literacy rates, poor 
infrastructure (which limit the growth of other media 
such as television, newspapers and internet) are some 
of the factors that make radio the main communication 
medium in the DRC. These factors informed the focus 
of this research on the radio component of the UN 
Mission’s PIO.  
Moreover, the UN’s Radio Okapi is unique in many 
ways. It is structurally and operationally different from 
previous UN Mission radio projects. Its operation is 
“outsourced” to a Swiss-based NGO—Hirondelle Foun-
dation. While previous UN Mission radio stations were 
directly operated by the Mission’s Public Information 
Department, Radio Okapi is operated by Hirondelle 
Foundation but under the authority of the Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary General and Head of MO-
NUC. Interestingly, Radio Okapi sets its own news and 
information agenda.  
Hirondelle Foundation has a policy of providing only 
objective and impartial information in crises areas. 
Contemporary understanding of the extent to which 
“objective information” can change prejudiced percep-
tions of the Other and violent behaviour is vague. Also 
limited is our understanding of what works in terms of 
the content of Information Intervention: the approach 
that provides objective information without any embel-
lishments or the psyops approach broadly defined as 
planned operations to “convey selected information 
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence emo-
tions, motives, objective reasoning” with the intention 
of inducing or reinforcing foreign attitudes and behav-
iour favourable to the originator’s objectives (Joint 
Publications, 2010).  
Within the UN itself there are contesting narratives 
and a seeming ambivalence over what approach works 
during peace support operations in crises states. Jean-
Marie Etter, Hirondelle Foundation’s President, be-
lieves that “in the long run, in areas of violent conflict, 
an informative approach—which may have fewer re-
sults in the short term, but will be more solid and will 
build confidence in the long term—will eventually be 
preferred,” (Domeniconi, 2004, p. 45). There has not 
been any empirical research on the ground to prove 
what approach works over time. Moreover, while there 
have been increasing interests on the role of the media 
in transforming conflicts in crises states, impacts of ac-
tual media intervention activities in ongoing conflicts 
have remained under-studied. The purpose of this 
study is to fill the gaps. It is a multi-method qualitative 
study—combining participatory, quasi-experimental 
and field based focus group methods. The study exam-
ines the nature and impacts of two intervention radio 
programmes broadcast on Radio Okapi. To build a clear 
picture of the ideological leanings of both organisa-
tions, a series of interviews were conducted with lead-
ers of Hirondelle Foundation and MONUC’s Public In-
formation Staff between November 2006 and March 
2010. The interviews were unstructured. They were 
controlled dialogues between the author and the in-
terviewees—in some cases face to face, in others by 
phone and in some other cases online using either 
Skype or email exchanges. Comments from the inter-
views and online exchanges provided a sound basis for 
defining and streamlining the core ideological debates 
of the study.  
2. The Significance of this Research 
This study is a reminder that radio as a communication 
medium is still a powerful tool of mass communication 
and indeed worthy of continued research. In an era 
where the Internet is the main buzz–word, researchers 
and research funders have been understandably more 
attracted to new media and Internet communications. 
With increasing interest and research funding going the 
way of online deliberation spaces, radio research is 
once again threatened with a return to the doghouse, 
to borrow Hilmes’, (2002, p. 8) parody.  
The study of radio has not been particularly attrac-
tive to 21st century media scholars and indeed funders. 
The disinterest dates back a bit more. In the past four 
decades, the study of popular culture has bloomed. But 
this bloom has unfortunately excluded Radio. Michele 
Hilmes attributes what she calls the negative “academ-
ic legitimation” of radio since the 1960s to the medi-
um’s “cultural marginality” and “low brow roots” 
(2002, p. 6). Indeed, since the late 1960s Radio has in-
creasingly been considered as low profile and inferior 
to other more technologically enhanced media such as 
Television. By the 1970s, as Hilmes has noted, industri-
ally, culturally, historiographically, and theoretically, 
Radio had been rendered invisible by the temper of the 
times. But Radio’s ostensible degeneration into a “vast 
cultural wasteland” (Squier, 2003, p. 1), did not appar-
ently affect international radio because it actually 
bloomed during the cold war as a tool for propaganda 
and public diplomacy. During the cold war, Radio Free 
Europe, the VOA, the BBC and other International 
broadcasters expanded and took on more strategic im-
portance in the international affairs departments of 
sponsor nations. Rawnsley has substantially filled the 
gaps on the use of radio as a propaganda tool during 
the cold war (1999, 1996).  
As a tool for psyops, public and cultural diplomacy, 
“surrogate radio” continues to occupy the attention of 
key Western Governments and their intelligence agen-
cies in borderlands including Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, 
etc. This work calls to mind that in Africa, beyond the 
realms of Western Governments’ use of radio for stra-
tegic purposes, radio remains the most popular medi-
um of communication—used frequently by the UN, 
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NGOs and Governments to reach citizens. Its misuse 
during the Rwandan genocide demonstrates its poten-
tials. A strong oral tradition, a social and cultural fond-
ness for storytelling, and devotion to radio borne out 
of absence of other means of mass communication, 
makes radio a potentially powerful tool for transform-
ing conflicts not only in sub–Saharan Africa but also in 
North Africa and the Middle East.  
Moreover, radio impels the Pan–African philosophy 
of Ubuntu—inspiring sharing, commonality and com-
munitarianism. Group listenerships to radio in rural ar-
eas provide a meeting point for exchange of stories 
and affinity, but more importantly a key anchor-point 
for sharing—sharing not only the radio receiver and 
the listening processes, but also meaning. This study 
draws attention to this reality about Africa and harps 
on the imperatives of designing Information Interven-
tion approaches that leverage on these elements. The 
work argues that the approach in Africa has to depart 
from the Western perception of an individualised radio 
audience or “listener”. Ethnographic observation of ra-
dio listeners in Uvira in South Kivu province of eastern 
DRC showed that radio audiences are not aggregates of 
individuals but are social entities bound together by 
shared histories, cultural ties and local epistemes. Me-
dia messages are consumed not individually, but col-
lectively. Meaning is collectively negotiated and shared 
among culturally inter–dependent beings. This has far–
reaching implications on the design and implementa-
tion of information contents for audiences in rural Afri-
ca. Current Western libertarian approach of seeking to 
achieve psychological impacts on “individuals” will 
have to give way to a more interactive approach aimed 
at achieving social impacts.  
3. Background to the UN’s Information Intervention in 
the DRC 
It is necessary to emphasise the importance of the Dis-
armament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Rehabilitation 
and Reintegration (DDRRR) programme to the trans-
formation of the DRC conflict. It is critical to our under-
standing of conflict transformation processes in the 
DRC because the presence of thousands of armed mili-
tia from neighbouring Rwanda has been the main rea-
son for the endurance of the DRC conflict. Indeed, the 
presence of foreign armed groups is damaging to in-
ternal security in the DRC. It also represents a standing 
obstacle to the improvement and normalisation of re-
lations between the DRC and its neighbours. 
(Swarbrick, 2004). The objective of the DDRRR pro-
gramme is to solve this problem. The central purpose 
of MONUC’s Mission after the successful conduct of 
general elections in 2006 was how to control the situa-
tion in the eastern DRC where most of the Rwandan 
Hutu FDLR elements are based. Moreover, other mili-
tant groups refused to disarm while the FDLR exists.  
After the Lusaka ceasefire agreement was signed 
with belligerent forces in the DRC in 1999, MONUC was 
mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter to enforce the agreement. Paragraph 
8.2.2 of the Lusaka Agreement had envisaged that the 
UN Mission would be involved in “tracking down and 
disarming armed groups…working out such measures, 
persuasive or coercive, as are appropriate for the at-
tainment of the objectives of disarming, assembling, 
repatriation and re–integration into society of mem-
bers of the armed groups” (1999, para. 8.2.2e). MO-
NUC however chose to principally pursue the “persua-
sive” rather than the “coercive” element of the 
agreement particularly regarding the disarmament and 
repatriation of FDLR elements in eastern DRC. Accord-
ing to Swarbrick (2004) this was the point where MO-
NUC differed significantly in its approach to DDRRR 
from what was envisaged by the Lusaka agreement.  
A hint to the UN’s DDRRR approach was given in the 
July 15 1999 Report of the Secretary General on the UN 
Preliminary Deployment in the DRC. The report noted 
that “a purely military solution appears to be impossi-
ble, if only because the forces most able and willing to 
impose a military solution have clearly failed to do so” 
(para. 22). Instead of military engagement, the Secre-
tary General noted the need for the establishment of a 
well-funded, well planned and long term programme of 
disarmament and demobilisation, but emphasised the 
need for a robust public information component—“the 
benefits of such a programme will need to be widely 
publicised in order to attract the fighters now under 
arms” (para. 24). This has underlined the UN’s strategic 
communications approach to DDRRR in the DRC.  
The radio magazine programme, Gutahuka (“go 
back home” in Kinyarwanda) was created specifically 
for the purpose of persuading ethnic Hutu combatants 
to voluntarily surrender and join the DDRRR process. 
MONUC’s Spokesman, Madnodje Mounoubai said the 
founding purpose of Gutahuka was to speak to “indi-
vidual combatants” of the FDLR in particular and 
Rwandan Hutus in the DRC in general to lay down their 
arms and return home. According to him, Gutahuka is 
an “alternative to military pressure” and was designed 
to fulfil the DDRRR mandate of the mission. He said 
Gutahuka is “a response to the difficulties to reach the 
FDLR combatants and an attempt to get information to 
non-combatants…to provide them with information on 
how they can go back to their country on a voluntary 
basis” (M. Mounoubai, personal communication, 
March 9, 2010). 
It is important to point out that whereas other pro-
grammes on Radio Okapi are produced by Hirondelle 
Foundation staff, Gutahuka on the other hand is pro-
duced directly by MONUC. It is broadcast once a day in 
the early hours, Monday to Saturday. Gutahuka specif-
ically targets Rwandan Hutus in Eastern DRC and seeks 
to convince them, particularly FDLR combatants, to re-
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turn to Rwanda. The programme can be roughly 
grouped into three segments. The first explains the 
DDRRR process and the second segment features “true 
stories” of ex-combatants who have returned to Rwan-
da. Families of ex-combatants as well as former FDLR 
Commanders that have returned are also interviewed 
in the second segment. Usually they talk of conditions 
in the Rwandan homeland and urge fighters to set 
aside their fear and return. The third segment is the 
call by the narrator on combatants to take up MO-
NUC’s offer of repatriation while it is still possible. Gut-
ahuka conveys three levels of normative appeals: De-
scriptive Norms, Injunctive Norms2 and Subjective 
Norms. As shown in Figure 2, the programme also ex-
plains the DDRRR processes and the financial benefits 
involved for returnees depending on their status. 
By interviewing ex-combatants and their extended 
family members, perceived norms are tied to the group 
identity of not only the FDLR network but also the Hutu 
ethnic group, to appeal as it were, to their sense of 
oneness, not only as a rebel network but also as a fami-
ly. In every edition of Gutahuka, MONUC fulfils Rimal 
and Real’s definition of descriptive norms in seeking to 
influence perception about “individuals’ beliefs about 
how widespread a particular behaviour is among their 
referent others” (2003, p. 185). On the other hand, Hi-
rondelle Foundation, as earlier pointed out, prefers an 
approach that provides objective information and rigor-
ous debates among contending factions, so that audi-
ences can make their own decisions (Jacob, 2010, 2015).  
This study maps the discourses and impacts of the 
contending ideologies through the prism of two radio 
programmes that represent the two ideological lean-
ings. The two intervention radio programmes studied 
in this research are: Dialogue entre Congolais (Dialogue 
between Congolese) and Gutahuka. Dialogue entre 
Congolais (Dialogue hereafter) is a political news–
magazine programme broadcast twice daily, Monday 
to Friday, on Radio Okapi. It explains the peace process 
and gives opportunities to belligerents to discuss their 
grievances openly. It is produced by Hirondelle Foun-
dation’s Radio Okapi staff. It can be argued that the 
communication philosophies or ideologies of MONUC 
and Hirondelle Foundation are represented and repro-
duced in Gutahuka and Dialogue respectively.  
4. Methodology 
In assessing the nature of impacts of the two pro-
grammes, “influentials” among Congolese autochthons 
and Rwandan Hutus across four towns in South Kivu, 
eastern DRC (Fizi, Mwenga, Uvira and Walungu) were 
selected using a refinement of Eric Nisbet’s (2006) en-
gagement model of opinion leadership. From the influ-
                                                          
2 Injunctive norms describe consequences for non-compliance 
with a prescribed form of behaviour.  
entials’ pool, a matched randomization technique was 
used to assign Hutus and autochthons in South Kivu to 
listen to either one of the two radio programmes with-
in their naturalistic contexts for a period of 13 months. 
Autochthon control groups listened to Gutahuka while 
Hutu control groups listened to Dialogue. Peer re-
searchers, selected from the participants were trained 
to monitor listenership for the entire period. At the 
end of the treatment, outcomes of perceptions of bar-
riers to peace; perceptions of descriptive and prescrip-
tive interventions; perceptions of victimhood and vil-
lainity; perceptions of opportunities for personal 
development and civic engagement; attitudes toward 
members of other ethnic groups as well as knowledge 
of MONUC’s DDRRR processes were assessed in a total 
of 16 focus groups moderated and recorded by the 
peer researchers. The peer researchers were fully 
trained for their responsibilities. 
Focus group membership was restricted to a maxi-
mum of 10 participants to avoid overcrowding. A 
matched randomization technique was used to assign 
participants to focus groups based on sex, age, combat 
status and civic status. This technique helped to reduce 
inter-group heterogeneity. Tables 1 and 2 show the 
demographic characteristics of participants at the focus 
groups in the two networks. 
Focus group comments (which were recorded ver-
batim) were analysed and integrated to show patterns 
and inter-relationships across contexts and networks 
and subsequently interpreted within the larger struc-
ture of the research enquiry. 
This methodological approach was chosen because 
of lessons learned from the limitations of most media 
influence studies very aptly outlined by McGuire (1986) 
to include no clear measurement of exposure to the 
media programme and poor or no clear measurement 
of a causal relationship between the programme and 
the outcome. To transcend these limitations, a labora-
tory-based approach seems ideal. However, while la-
boratory–based experiments with their implicit con-
trols and artificiality can precisely map causal impacts, 
they lack the ability to compensate for the psychody-
namic variables that underlie the actions of combat-
ants and the interactions between militants and/or vil-
lains and victims in a conflict situation. Moreover, 
variables of the “real world situation” such as the social 
semiotics of the conflict itself, including media reports 
and the knowledge thereof; rumours and other socially 
transmitted information; emotions of fear, guilt, anger, 
trauma and sadness due to personal loss or even rape 
are ignored in laboratory studies. Paluck (2007) who has 
used a similar approach combining field observational 
and experimental methods writes that “artificiality is 
particularly damaging in media impact because media 
consumption is truly the sum of all its social and phe-
nomenological parts” (p. 24). On the other hand, while 
field–based studies using observational, focus group or 
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Table 1. Demography of Hutu ethnic network Focus Group discussants. 
Contexts Uvira Walungu Fizi Mwenga 
Programme G  D G D G D G D 
Mean Age 32 33 38 36 32 31 32 33 
Sex (% women) 30 30 30 30 30 30 40 30 
Combat Status (% ex-
combatants) 
40 40 20 20 50 50 30 30 
Civic Status (% Mar-
ried/Co-habiting 
30 30 20 20 20 20 30 30 
Cellule Listenership 
Compliance (%)* 
100 98 98 97 98 96 95 94 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Notes: Sample demonstrating balance between listening groups in Hutu Groups. G = Gutahuka listening cellule; 
D=Dialogue listening cellule. *Cellule Listenership Compliance (CLC) percentages were derived from participants’ re-
cordings of listenership in their monthly log-book returns in each cellule. 
Table 2. Demography of autochthon network Focus Group discussants. 
Contexts Uvira Walungu Fizi Mwenga 
Programme G D G D G D G D 
Mean Age 43 42 33 33 33 34 32 31 
Sex (% women) 30 30 30 40 30 40 40 40 
Combat Status (% ex-
combatants) 
0 0 30 30 20 20 10 10 
Civic Status (% 
Married/co-habiting) 
80 80 50 50 60 60 70 70 
Cellule Listenership 
Compliance (%)* 
91 97 80 87 86 90 76 78 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Notes: Sample demonstrating balance between listening groups in Autochthon Groups. G = Gutahuka listening cellule; 
D = Dialogue listening cellule. *Cellule Listenership Compliance (CLC) percentages were derived from participants’ re-
cordings of listenership in their monthly log-book returns in each cellule. 
interview techniques parade the real world situation, 
they are restricted in terms of their competence in 
mapping out clear causal pathways that link exposure 
with response. Also, it is usually based on self–reported 
exposure which may not be accurate. Moreover, one of 
the setbacks with most media impact researches, de-
spite whatever technique used, is the tenure of expo-
sure. Such studies are usually too brief to capture the 
entire process of exposure. The duration and/or repeti-
tion of the media programme are rarely captured 
whereas most media intervention programmes run 
over a long period of time. Gutahuka and Dialogue for 
instance have been broadcasting for over seven years. 
This length of time as Paluck (2007, 2009) has suggest-
ed can introduce reinforcements and familiarity effects 
on the relationship between presenter and listener 
thus engendering feelings of loyalty and emotional at-
tachment to the programme. It can also create apathy 
or even resentment. 
Furthermore, because of the conflict situation in 
the DRC (involving clandestine and guerrilla armed 
groups) and the peculiar foreigner/indigene crises in 
South Kivu, a research methodology that draws maxi-
mally on ethnic membership is imperative. A participa-
tory approach involving the communities researched 
offered a unique opportunity for monitoring listener-
ship in the first instance; for frankness and reflexive 
engagement with questions during focus group discus-
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sions within a setting that is inartificial and uninter-
rupted by “outsiders”. Moreover, focus group modera-
tion by trained peer researchers recreated contextually 
organic social conversations which were critical to the 
research. 
5. Findings and Discussion 
5.1. Perception of Prescriptive Transformations in 
Dialogue Listening Groups 
When asked about their beliefs concerning what need-
ed to be done to achieve peace and development in 
their communities in particular and the country in gen-
eral, an interesting pattern emerged in Dialogue 
groups’ comments across the two ethnic networks. The 
comments reflected the salient themes in the pro-
gramme Dialogue. Participants did not express specific 
ways and means through which sustainable conflict 
transformation (or peace and development) can be 
achieved in their communities or in the region but in all 
contexts they talked about structural elements which 
they linked to poor leadership both at regional and na-
tional levels. In two of the contexts, (Uvira and 
Mwenga) corruption was specifically mentioned as one 
of the main impediments to conflict transformation—a 
salient topic on Dialogue. This pattern significantly de-
parts from the control group where participants across 
contexts mostly talked about relational issues of au-
tochthony and allochthony (foreigner). Basically, au-
tochthon Gutahuka listeners reasoned that if foreign-
ers (primarily Rwandan Hutus) left the country, there 
would be peace—reflecting the underlying meaning of 
Gutahuka’s “go back home” message.  
The emerging implication here is that Dialogue par-
ticipants perceived prescriptive transformations along 
the trajectory of structural interventions not necessari-
ly within the rubric of immediate issue or relational 
concerns such as presence of foreigners, but on the 
imperatives of credible political leadership. While im-
mediate issue concerns are by no means less important 
or less urgent, an understanding of the imperatives of 
credible leadership in transforming the problems of the 
DRC suggests a collective consciousness of the role of a 
legitimate or democratically elected government in 
transforming deep–seated socio-political issues. This is 
important in a country that has seen over 40 years of 
corrupt authoritarian government out of some 55 years 
of independence. It suggests a new appreciation of 
values of good governance and accountability. The 
sharp contrasts between their beliefs and those of 
their contemporaries and in some cases neighbours 
and close Others that listened to Gutahuka during the 
period validates the influence of the programmes on 
participants’ opinions regarding issues that concerned 
them and their normative beliefs about transfor-
mation.  
5.2. Engagement with New Democratic Values and 
Reforms in Dialogue Groups 
In addition to patterns of more factual, logical and ob-
jective expressions of perceptions of barriers to peace 
and a deeper understanding of structural conflict trans-
formation factors, perception of civic engagement was 
investigated in relation to Gutahuka control groups. 
Across the two ethnic networks, Dialogue participants’ 
comments showed a greater sense of responsibility 
and ownership of democratic reforms. When com-
menting on their engagement with community self–
help projects and new democratic processes they used 
words such as “my responsibility” (Walungu Group), 
“an obligation” (Fizi Group), “our community” 
(Mwenga). There was also evidence of participants’ in-
volvement in civic duties and other active expressions 
of civic engagement during the course of the pro-
gramme. For example in Walungu, an autochthon par-
ticipant said he has started calling-in during phone-in 
programmes on the local radio although he said it was 
expensive to make the phone calls, but added “If I 
don’t do it who would? We can’t leave it and hope that 
somehow those up there would know what we think” 
(Walungu Group). In Uvira another autochthon Dia-
logue participant said he has recently (during the 
course of the listenership) taken part in a conflict reso-
lution meeting organised by MONUC’s Joint Protection 
Teams (JPTs) in Uvira where he had opportunity to talk 
about communal issues of interest and wished there 
were more of such opportunities. Also, a Dialogue par-
ticipant in Fizi said his church is involved in supporting 
de–mining activities, but although he is not directly in-
volved since it is not in his hometown, he believed it 
was an obligation to take part in community efforts 
such as building schools, maternal care and birth cen-
tres among others. Across all contexts and networks, 
Dialogue participants perceived themselves as stake-
holders in their society’s wellbeing. Another interesting 
pattern is that participants in Dialogue groups all linked 
opportunities for personal development to stability, 
peace and development in their region. Expressions 
used included: “if there are roads and security…” (Uvira 
group); “if things are stable…” (Fizi group); “security on 
the roads…” (Walungu group) and “there has to be 
peace first” (Mwenga group).  
Another pattern noticed across contexts among the 
Dialogue participants was the perception of civic en-
gagement as needful. They also had a positive percep-
tion of opportunities for their personal development in 
the DRC as well as a sense of optimism or hope for a 
better future for their communities. This cannot be 
said to be the case with Gutahuka listeners who in 
most contexts were more inclined towards short-term 
needs such as “food in the stomach” (Walungu group), 
“worried about my own stomach” (Fizi group) etc. The 
implication is that Dialogue listeners linked attainment 
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of their personal development goals with a stable soci-
ety in the DRC. Stability is constructed within frames of 
not only absence of war, but also infrastructural devel-
opment—roads, bridges as well as general security. 
This explains their perception of themselves as stake-
holders in their community’s wellbeing. Patterns in be-
liefs expressed in Gutahuka groups in both networks 
were fundamentally different. Participants did not talk 
about any civic engagement activity there were in-
volved in. Their comments suggested that they per-
ceived politicians as being responsible for the wellbe-
ing of their community and that the political system 
offered no opportunities for civic engagement.  
Expressions of normative beliefs about new demo-
cratic values and descriptive interventions by Hutu Dia-
logue listeners show a pattern that matches those of 
autochthon listeners. In their discussion of descriptive 
interventions, Hutu Dialogue listeners firstly, displayed 
very good knowledge of ongoing intervention efforts of 
the DRC government (although they believed the inter-
ventions were weak and half–hearted); secondly there 
was a pattern of Hutu Dialogue listeners claiming a 
stake or ownership of transformation processes. Alt-
hough they all acknowledged that political participa-
tion for them is limited by their identity and restricted 
citizenship, they were as optimistic as the autochthon 
Dialogue groups of the DRC government’s ability to fix 
the issues if things were done right. Unlike Gutahuka 
listeners across both networks, Hutu Dialogue listeners 
across contexts saw intervention activities as being 
within the trajectory of the DRC’s elected government. 
This supports patterns observed among Autochthon lis-
teners who saw credible political leadership as an es-
sential element in conflict transformation processes. 
Among both autochthon and Hutu Dialogue listeners 
there is a strong pattern of engagement, a sense of 
ownership and relatively greater factual, logical and 
objective expression of issues.  
Moreover, autochthon Dialogue listeners expressed 
a more favourable attitude toward Rwandan Hutus than 
did autochthon Gutahuka listeners. When asked about 
what they imagined their relationship with the ethnic 
Other would be in the future, Dialogue participants 
talked mostly about the impediment of Citizenship. Par-
ticipants said there was no systematic framework and 
transparency of regulations for attaining citizenship 
which has been used as a political tool by successive 
governments in the DRC. There was the underlying rea-
soning among Dialogue participants across contexts that 
when crises of citizenship are resolved, communities 
could then decide to forge ahead together as a people.  
The most revealing expressions of autochthon Dia-
logue participants’ attitude toward Hutus was in their 
comments about who they felt were the worst victims 
of the conflicts. There was an interesting pattern across 
all contexts of autochthon Dialogue listenership 
groups. All groups talked about Hutu refugees as being 
among the worst victims of the conflict. The empathy 
with Hutus was strong among participants and evident 
in their tone. For example in Fizi, a participant said “It 
is hard not to feel for them (Hutus)…haunted and hat-
ed by everyone”. In Uvira, a participant expressed a 
view that is very rarely expressed among non-Hutus: 
“genocide has been committed against them (Hutus) 
but everyone is talking about Tutsi genocide”. In 
Walungu, participants said no one can ever tell what 
Hutus have gone through since they fled Rwanda in 
1994. These sentiments were in contrast with those 
expressed by the control Gutahuka listening groups. In 
the autochthon Gutahuka groups, there was no men-
tion of Hutus as victims of the conflict at all. But wom-
en (mainly pregnant women) were identified as the 
worst victims. Also, with exceptions in Fizi, autochthon 
Gutahuka listeners across all contexts wanted all 
Rwandans—both Hutus and Tutsis to leave. When 
asked to talk about their imagination of future rela-
tionships with other ethnic groups, again except in Fizi, 
Gutuhuka listeners said they did not think it would ever 
be possible for all ethnic groups to integrate and live 
together peacefully as a community. They also said it 
would not be possible to have a unified army involving 
all the ethnic groups because they thought it would be 
difficult to get all the groups to transcend their person-
al interests and that of their ethnic groups to work to-
gether within a unified Congolese security force. Again 
there was an exception in Fizi on this. Overall, partici-
pants across listening groups in Fizi felt far more com-
fortable with the ethnic Other than participants in the 
other contexts. This is possibly because in Fizi, there 
has been a long history of mutually beneficial relation-
ships between Hutus and autochthons not only in in-
ter–marriage but also in trade. For years, both groups 
have lived side by side with each other and conflicts 
have been very minimal between them. Indeed, in Fizi, 
MONUC does not even have the kind of robust pres-
ence such as Joint Protection Teams and Company Op-
erational Bases (COBs) deployment like they do in the 
other towns. This illustrates the relative calm in the 
territory when compared with the other towns.  
Among Congolese autochthons there is a strongly 
noticeable pattern of contrasts between both listening 
groups’ perceptions of Hutus. There is a pattern of em-
pathy and constructive engagement evident in Dia-
logue listeners’ attitude towards not only Hutus but al-
so the ethnic Other in general, but most noticeably 
among the Hutus. Perceptions of Hutus as victims of 
the conflict reflect a sense of empathy with the Hutu 
refugees in their communities. Granted, expressions of 
sympathy may not necessarily reflect actual sympa-
thetic attitude of listeners toward Hutus, but they are 
suggestive of what they think about the Hutus which in 
turn inform attitude. Furthermore, the discussion ap-
proach used in the focus groups was designed to assess 
attitudes through cognitive processes and not direct 
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questioning. So participants did not (in this case) have 
to answer direct attitude measurement questions such 
as “what do you think of the Hutu?” But they had the 
latitude to talk about whoever they felt were affected or 
afflicted most by the DRC war. A pattern in answers 
across contexts suggest a linkage between the pro-
gramme listened to and perceptions of victimhood in 
general and victims of the conflict in particular. Dialogue 
participants expressed the need for a process where Hu-
tus can access Congolese citizenship. Citizenship in the 
DRC is a highly politically contested issue. This is because 
it confers various rights, benefits and entitlements in-
cluding land ownership. So this further shows that they 
have a positive attitude toward Hutus in contrast to 
Gutahuka listeners who believed integration both at the 
community level and within the army was impossible.  
Arguably, Dialogue can positively influence regular 
autochthon listeners’ attitude toward Rwandan Hutus. 
This is attributable to the transactional nature of the 
programme. The programme is based on a model that 
illustrates mass communication as a horizontal or 
transactional process. By creating a platform for rigor-
ous debates of key issues that confront the community 
as a whole, the programme encourages audiences to 
participate in evaluating the current situation, to per-
ceive the current situation based on the different posi-
tions debated and to interpret the debates in a way 
that fits their own peculiar episteme. This interpreta-
tion can either lead to convergence or divergence with-
in the communication network (please see Kincaid 
1993; Rogers, 1995; Rogers & Kincaid, 1981).  
Indeed, Dialogue represents a transactional media 
regime that draws on communitarian media values. It 
seeks to collectively negotiate social construction of the 
common good and engages Radio Okapi as a member of 
the community—constantly debating and exploring the 
common good. Regular exposure of community mem-
bers to Dialogue created a new reality or new sets of 
mediated norms among listeners, built not necessarily 
on the historically dysfunctional patterns of social rela-
tions or solely on the subjective norms of political elites 
or guerrilla entrepreneurs, but on a reconditioning of 
objective and subjective norms using the tools of credi-
ble and interactive media. Objective norms are ongoing 
events that constitute the bases or backdrop for discus-
sions in Dialogue. Subjective norms purveyed by elites 
are refined into a more transactional mode—involving 
debates on the issues rather than the top-down ped-
dling of subjective norms in Gutahuka. These have impli-
cations on contemporary debates on the normative role 
of the media particularly in crises societies, and its influ-
ence on beliefs and attitudes toward the Other.  
5.3. Process of Perception Change in Dialogue Groups 
It is very important to explore in greater detail how Dia-
logue influenced perceptions and attitudes of listeners 
so significantly. The paper will argue that this was 
achieved through a transactional process of exposure to 
information about the current situation, ideation, inter-
pretation and (re) evaluation of ongoing events or cur-
rent situation—to achieve changes in personal percep-
tions.  
5.3.1. Exposure to Current Situation 
By first talking about the event to create a background 
to the debates, Dialogue exposed listeners to the ob-
jective reality of ongoing events at local, national and 
regional levels (or current situation) with its implicit in-
ter-relationships. Participants were also directly ex-
posed to some of the events through either the media 
or during their daily lives. 
5.3.2. Ideation 
Ideation involves evolution of knowledge of the issues 
in contention as selected, clarified and discussed in 
Dialogue. It connotes a knowledge process that 
evolves along with exposure to ongoing events, clari-
fication, discussion and personal evaluation of the is-
sues debated on Dialogue. Ideation was achieved at 
three transactional levels—first direct exposure to 
ongoing events or objective reality; secondly, expo-
sure to clarifications and discussions in Dialogue; and 
thirdly, through a process of personal evaluation and 
re-evaluation conditioned by personal interpretation, 
clarifications, discussants’ perspectives and proposals 
on Dialogue (please see Figure 1). Ideation was not 
constant but dynamic—constantly changing along 
with a constantly changing objective reality and the 
(re)evaluation thereof. Constantly evolving events, 
debates arguing for different sides of the issues not 
only enhanced ideation but also led to series of eval-
uations and re–evaluations both at personal and 
group levels. In the perception process, ideation was 
constantly refined by exposure to real world events 
(and the variables that underlie them), as well as ex-
posure to reconstructed versions or debates of some 
of those events on Dialogue. Exposure to recon-
structed realities in turn conditioned participants’ in-
terpretation of objective realities. There were indeed 
cases where participants used the same arguments, 
logic and phrases used by their preferred Dialogue 
discussants to buttress their points during focus 
group discussions. The process of ideation also under-
lined participants’ understanding and interpretation 
of the issues which led to either their disbelief or af-
firmation of previous beliefs or even adoption of a 
whole new set of beliefs. Importantly, knowledge de-
rived from clarified discussions of issues on Dialogue 
enhanced an understanding of the Other’s issues 
hence potentially achieving mutual understanding 
and agreement. 
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Figure 1. Process of perception change in Dialogue groups. 
5.3.3. Re-Evaluation of Current Situation 
Three salient elements in Dialogue defined partici-
pants’ constantly evolving evaluation of realities: clari-
fications of topics (in Dialogue, discussion issues are 
first explained and the background information provid-
ed); Dialogue discussants’ expressions of their discur-
sive perceptions of the issues clarified based on their 
own world view; and proposal for a way forward on the 
issues—usually summed up by the moderator. 
Throughout the process of listening, each participant’s 
impressions of the issues and related phenomena were 
constantly redefined along with their understanding 
and interpretation of the issues. Understanding and 
personal interpretation of the issues were influenced 
by each participant’s re–evaluation of the issues after 
exposure and greater knowledge. Comments at focus 
groups reflected not only a greater depth of knowledge 
on issues but also a larger breadth of analyses by indi-
vidual participants on the issues. 
5.3.4. Personal Perception  
Personal Perception of the issues relating to conflict 
transformation processes, intervention mechanisms 
and the impediments thereof reflected, not necessarily 
the views purveyed by discussants on Dialogue, but a 
new stream of perception borne out of personal inter-
pretation, mutual agreement and understanding. Con-
flict transforms perceptions of self, the Other and the 
issues in contention (Lederach, 1995, 1997). Lederach’s 
works have shown that a salient impact of conflict on 
the communication patterns of conflict groups is a de-
creased ability to articulate one’s intentions in a man-
ner that is credible and devoid of propaganda and 
rhetoric. When compared with the control group, Dia-
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logue–treated participants shared meaning in a more 
robust and reflective manner. Moreover individual par-
ticipants re-engaged with the ethnic Other, based not 
on the negative descriptive languages found in the con-
trol groups’ expressions, but on an objective and logical 
evaluation of the self, the Other and the contending is-
sues such as citizenship and barriers to peace. At per-
sonal levels, personal advocacy was noticed in partici-
pants’ comments about various community engagement 
activities they had become involved in since their par-
ticipation in the research. At group levels, although 
there were lesser agreements on topics discussed, 
there was a greater level of collective self-efficacy, and 
collective sense of ownership of transformation pro-
cesses.  
In summary, Dialogue discussions were horizontal 
and transactional. They enabled individual and group 
level evaluation and re-evaluation of the different posi-
tions purveyed by discussants. New levels of percep-
tion that emerged from understanding and belief pro-
moted individual advocacy, perception and attitudinal 
change. In situations where the new thinking is trans-
mitted through social or informal means within the 
community, social impact can be achieved through col-
lective self–efficacy which in turn can have actual ef-
fects on the events discussed on Dialogue. 
5.4. Ethnic Awareness and Perceptions of Victimhood in 
Gutahuka Groups 
Congolese autochthons exposed to Gutahuka ex-
pressed more awareness of the ethnic and political di-
visions that can deter future social and political rela-
tionships. Across contexts, except in Fizi with its 
peculiar socio–cultural blend of Hutus and autoch-
thons, Gutahuka-exposed autochthons were pessimis-
tic about possibilities of a unified Congolese army in-
volving all the ethnic groups including settled Hutus. 
This contrasts with opinions of Dialogue listeners who 
recommended that questions of citizenship be resolved 
once and for all to enable communities to integrate 
peacefully. Generally, Dialogue participants believed 
there were opportunities for integration and a mutual-
ly rewarding relationship across ethnic groups if issues 
of identity and citizenship were resolved. A salient pat-
tern of difference in beliefs between the listening 
groups is that Dialogue listeners showed more empa-
thy towards Hutus than listeners of Gutahuka. In dis-
cussing their perceptions of Victimhood, Autochthon 
listeners of Gutahuka did not see Hutus as victims of 
the conflict whereas autochthon Dialogue listeners 
across all contexts believed Hutus were among the 
main victims of the conflict, implying as it were, a 
greater sense of empathy towards the Hutus. In one of 
the Gutahuka groups (Mwenga), Hutus were even 
identified as the Villains. Dialogue listeners’ perception 
of Villainity centred on corrupt politicians.  
It had been envisaged at the beginning of the study 
that exposure to the Other’s programme would deep-
en an understanding and empathy with the Other’s is-
sues, but the reverse has been the case in autochthon 
listeners of Gutahuka. They perceived Hutus as the 
problem and expressed the normative appeal in Guta-
huka that peace in the DRC is linked to FDLR militants 
(embedded in Hutu communities) repatriating to Rwan-
da. Interestingly, Hutu Dialogue listeners had mixed per-
ceptions of Victimhood and Villainity that did not show 
any particular pattern. Again, this reflects the discursive 
and analytical nature of the programme Dialogue.  
Beliefs expressed by autochthon listeners of Guta-
huka have far–reaching implications on contentious 
debates on the impacts of exposure to contents meant 
for the Other in deeply divided societies and the over-
arching debates on the role of the media in reinforcing 
dominant power relations in the society. There has 
been a retinue of interesting scholarly works that sup-
port the position that the media convey mainstream 
outlooks and normative beliefs about behaviour (Bar-
ak, 1994; Gerbner, Signorielli, & Morgan, 1982; Signor-
ielli & Morgan, 1989; among others). Indeed, Barak 
(1994) has observed how media contents identify he-
roes, villains, and neutral characters and associate 
them with specific traits, beliefs or forms of behaviour 
and in other cases label and stigmatise certain activi-
ties and individuals or groups as antisocial, deviant or 
undesirable. He posits that such associations have rela-
tive implications on social control. Also, Mutz (1998) 
has written brilliantly on the “impersonal” nature of in-
fluence by media portrayals of attitudes, beliefs or ex-
periences of collectives outside an individual’s personal 
life space. She has argued for “impersonal influence” to 
be taken more seriously because of its potential to ex-
pand contemporary understanding of social influence 
processes from media portrayals of indirect associa-
tions. This research provides important evidence within 
the spheres of Barak’s (1994) “symbolic deviance” and 
Mutz’ (1998) “impersonal influence”. By constantly 
calling on FDLR militants to repatriate, Gutahuka labels 
or stigmatizes Hutus in general as deviant and undesir-
able. This is because there is a social reality that associ-
ates the FDLR with Hutus and vice versa, which in turn 
creates unspoken assumptions and cognitive framing 
of the Hutu Other as “foreign”, “unwelcome”, “devi-
ant” and “undesirable” among autochthon listeners of 
the programme. Although autochthons are not the tar-
get audience for the programme, they are as exposed if 
not more exposed to it as the targets themselves—
more exposed because FDLR militants in the forests are 
prevented by their commanders from listening to the 
programme for fear they would be convinced to sur-
render. Obviously Radio is not selective in its reach; 
hence audiences who are not targets of a particular in-
tervention programme but are exposed to it do end up 
consuming the programme. In the case of Gutahuka, 
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although MONUC presents the programme in Kinyar-
wanda—the language spoken among Hutus in Rwanda, 
most Congolese in the Kivus understand and speak Kin-
yarwanda fairly fluently having lived side by side with 
Rwandans for several years. For non-targets, Guta-
huka’s messages construct “symbolic deviance”—
involving unspoken assumptions, associations and 
framing of the FDLR combatant as an “unwelcome” or 
undesirable Hutu. This in turn impugns on non–Targets’ 
perception of the Hutu Other. The “Otherization” of Hu-
tus is further deepened by media reports of joint military 
activities against the FDLR. An autochthon Gutahuka 
group member in Mwenga said of Hutus: “there must be 
a problem with you when everybody is pursuing you”. 
The result is what Barak (1994) terms “symbolic pun-
ishment” through stigmatisation or labelling of the Hutu 
Other as antisocial, deviant or undesirable. Such negativ-
ity may not be expressed explicitly in Gutahuka but dy-
namic interactions of Gutahuka’s messages and implicit 
normative appeals with unspoken assumptions rooted in 
an epistemic association of the FDLR with Hutus and vice 
versa lead to the construction of symbolic deviance not 
intended by the programme creators.  
Although Gutahuka’s messages and normative ap-
peals (see Figure 2) are intended to restore peace in 
South Kivu by achieving voluntary repatriation of FDLR 
elements and Hutu civilians, they do have negative im-
plications on social relations between autochthons and 
the Hutu Other when considered against the backdrop 
of a social reality or discursive formation that associ-
ates the FDLR with Hutus and vice versa—an associa-
tion taken for granted or unaccounted for in the pro-
gramme. By problematising the FDLR-Hutu, Gutahuka 
created or deepened animosity towards Hutus among 
autochthon listeners in three of the four contexts re-
searched. In the fourth context, Fizi, there is a historical 
reality that supports a mutual alliance and cordial rela-
tions between the autochthons and Hutus. This in turn 
is supported by local influentials that purvey localised 
subjective realities or norms. Fizi Participants’ engage-
ments with objective realities or ongoing events and 
with the mediated reality of Gutahuka were thus condi-
tioned by stronger historical and subjective realities 
which make up the discursive formation of their society. 
In the other contexts however, Gutahuka further 
reinforces the dominant power relations by depicting 
the FDLR as the problem and not the breakdown in so-
cial relations and other structural causes of the conflict. 
The result has been a “we-they” cognitioning and ex-
pression of relations between the autochthon “self” 
and the Hutu Other. This is evident in a comment by an 
autochthon Gutahuka listener in Walungu: “They (Hu-
tus) have raped thousands of our women, killed thou-
sands of our young men, stolen everything they can 
steal, they are the ones that have kept us where we are 
today”. 
 
Figure 2. Appeal to norms: The Gutahuka communication strategy. 
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The calibration of the Hutu as a normative Other is only 
evident among autochthon Gutahuka listening groups. 
Although living within the same contexts with Hutus, 
and having regular interpersonal interactions with 
them, perception of Hutus in three of the contexts 
seem to be influenced more deeply from Gutahuka 
representations of the FDLR/Hutus than from their 
day-to-day interactions with them. This corroborates 
Mutz’ position that people respond “to a media–
constructed pseudoenvironment—rather than their 
immediate personal experiences or those of friends 
and acquaintances” (1998, p. 6).  
At a broader level, media (re)constructed reality is 
not necessarily about the direct persuasive or influence 
potentials of media messages that set out to change 
behaviour or a viewpoint. Mediated reality is the media 
superstructure’s refinement of the subjective reality 
(or opinions or experience of influential collectives) 
purveyed by elites or political/military actors to influ-
ence citizens (as in the case of purveyors of subjective 
norms in Gutahuka). Because of the media’s expertise 
in matters that are beyond the realm of citizens’ per-
sonal experiences, they are perceived as more reliable 
sources of information. Mutz (1998) has argued that 
media content is particularly well suited and used as a 
credible channel of information about such collective 
subjective realities. Essentially, in the context of a vio-
lently divided society where, as Lederach (1997) has 
written, perceptions of self, the Other and the issues in 
contention are constantly altered resulting in a “con-
taminated” interpretation and understanding of the 
Other’s intentions, media intervention contents have 
strong potential impacts even on non-Target listeners. 
As findings have shown, non–Target listeners exposed 
to contents aimed at changing the behaviour of the 
ethnic Other resulted in more negative perceptions of 
the Other compared with participants that listened to a 
political debate programme—Dialogue. In the commu-
nities researched, participants were exposed to a 
communicative sphere that drew on four contending 
realities with varying degrees of potential impacts on 
interpretation and engagement with mediated con-
tents: Historical Reality, Objective Reality, Subjective 
Reality and Mediated Reality.  
5.5. Contending Realities in Narrative Frameworks of 
Dialogue and Gutahuka 
Participants’ comments during focus groups show that 
communication patterns of groups researched were 
overwhelmingly rooted in their memory or knowledge 
of previous conflicts, events or interrelationships. His-
torical realities define the epistemes within which met-
aphors, memories, discursive practices and communi-
cation patterns of each network are negotiated. Hugh 
Miall (2004) has argued that collective memories are a 
salient element that should be of interest to conflict 
transformers because memories of past conflicts de-
termine groups’ expectations in future relationships 
and significantly determine their behaviour toward the 
Other and how meaning is shared. In this study, key in-
fluentials or purveyors of subjective realities were 
themselves influenced by historical realities which in 
turn infected their communication patterns. Partici-
pants in the focus groups were at the intersection of a 
triad of realities that in addition to other factors de-
fined their perceptions. Those exposed to a mediated 
reality that did not provide a platform for objectively 
engaging and debating with the historical and subjec-
tive realities in the triad were subjected to the norma-
tive influences of those realities in their engagement 
with media contents. Exposure to the Others’ media 
contents within a communicative sphere or intersec-
tion that is hostile to the Other created a stronger neg-
ative opinion of the ethnic Other. The tendency to 
blame the Hutu–Other for the misfortune of the au-
tochthon-self was intensified with exposure to the Hu-
tu–Other’s behaviour change messages. In each con-
text studied, historical realities defined how 
participants expressed their views, how programme 
messages were interpreted and the various ways they 
sought alternative mediated or socially transmitted in-
formation that met their peculiar needs (please see 
Figure 3). Exceptions were found however among par-
ticipants exposed to a media platform where the con-
tending realities were confronted and debated. 
6. Conclusion 
Radio is a ubiquitous mass medium—generally re-
ceived by all within the reach of the transmitting sta-
tion. Hence there are possibilities that non–Targets 
may be exposed to behaviour-change contents not 
meant for them. This study engaged with the question 
of how disparate networks operating within homoge-
nous contexts engage with information products 
meant for the Other. There is evidence in this research 
that exposure of non-targets to behaviour change con-
tents meant for the Other can create hostility against 
the targets. Congolese autochthons exposed to Guta-
huka during the period did not develop a sense of affin-
ity with the Hutus as envisaged, but hostility. Across 
contexts, they expressed the belief that if Hutus and all 
Rwandans left the DRC there would be peace, reflective 
of the normative appeals in Gutahuka that portray the 
armed group, the FDLR as barriers to peace. Epistemic 
associations between the FDLR and the Hutu impelled 
autochthon participants to express sentiments of unde-
sirability regarding not only the FDLR but also the Oth-
erised Hutu. Here was arguably one of the sharpest 
contrasts between perceptions of Autochthon listen-
ers of Dialogue and their Gutahuka listening counter-
parts. Autochthon Dialogue listeners were more em-
pathetic with what they saw as plight of the Hutus. 
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Figure 3. Contending realities in conflict settings. 
Across all contexts of the study, they identified Hutus 
as one of the main victims of the war and expressed 
emotions of empathy to their plight. Among the Guta-
huka listeners, there was no mention of Hutus at all 
(even passively) as victims of the conflict. The emerging 
implication is that Dialogue listeners were more analyt-
ical of the conflict situation and the dynamics thereof 
including issues of causality, casualty, victimhood and 
villainity, and the various military operations targeted 
at the FDLR (but inevitably also fatally affecting Hutu 
civilians and refugees) as a basis for their perception of 
Hutus as victims. Gutahuka listeners on the other hand 
perceived the various military operations against the 
FDLR as evidence of the undesirability of not just the 
FDLR fighter but also his (the fighter’s) family. Simply 
put, the same objective reality of military operations 
against the FDLR elicited two fundamentally different 
perceptions from listeners within the same network 
and contexts based on the nature of intervention pro-
grammes each was exposed to. 
Two critical implications emerge. First, hate contents 
are not only the ones that are overtly hateful. Messages 
targeted at specific groups for the purpose of achieving 
behavioural change can lead to alienation and hostility 
toward the Target group by the Other (non–target) 
groups exposed to the messages. The implication is that 
media intervention contents that purvey a narrative 
without first understanding how it interacts with other 
epistemic narratives, metaphors and historical realities 
on ground run the risk of deepening rifts between 
groups and escalating the conflict. Another implication is 
that contextually associated individuals or social groups 
do not always have homogenous interpretation, percep-
tion and/or decoding of media messages. At the core of 
these discursive perceptions is the ideological orienta-
tion of messages audiences are exposed to and how 
they interact with historical and subjective realities on 
ground. Whereas Gutahuka called on FDLR militants to 
disarm and return, Dialogue encouraged objective and 
pluralistic analyses of the conflict including the crises sit-
uation and the underlying issues within a narrative 
framework that demands of listeners a level of iterative 
evaluation, understanding and interpretation to achieve 
individual and collective belief or disbelief. This can ex-
plain why Dialogue listeners across contexts and net-
works perceived failed interventions of the DRC gov-
ernment as one of the main barriers to peace. This 
shows that Dialogue listeners’ construction of conflict 
transformation processes and conflict multipliers rest on 
the activities or inactivities of the democratically elected 
government in the DRC and not the presence of Hutu 
“foreigners”. Though dissatisfied with the intervention 
activities of the government, Dialogue listeners’ re-
sponses showed they perceived the government as en-
dowed with the legitimacy and political license needed 
to tackle the problems.  
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An essential ingredient in the democratic process of 
the DRC—a country that has experienced over 40 years 
of brutal military rule out of about 55 years of self-rule, 
is recognition of the legitimacy of the democratically 
elected government and the new institutions set up to 
support democracy and good governance. Importantly, 
Dialogue participants’ discussions of prescriptions for 
conflict transformation centred on specific actions the 
government and its institutions could take to achieve 
peace. Interestingly, autochthon Dialogue listeners did 
not see any ethnic group as a barrier to peace, and nei-
ther indeed did Hutu Dialogue listeners. Whereas Hutu 
Gutahuka listeners saw the “Tutsi government” of 
Rwanda as the greatest barrier to peace, Hutu Dialogue 
listeners saw the inactions of the Congolese Govern-
ment as barriers to peace—corroborating the percep-
tion of autochthon Dialogue listeners of the Go-DRC’s 
legitimacy and capability to live up to its mandate if 
supported and if issues of corruption are solved. 
Through the programme Dialogue, Radio Okapi per-
forms more than mere cognitive functions of providing 
objective information. The programme also undertakes 
interpretative functions including analyses, evaluation, 
assessments and comments. Discussants in some cases 
are not only the authors of the cognitive and interpre-
tative elements of Dialogue but also the authors of the 
very issues they seek to interpret. Through the pro-
gramme, they are able to present their arguments 
within their own narrative frameworks. Their narrative 
frameworks are different from the narrative frame-
works in Radio Okapi’s news discourses with its inher-
ent gate–keeping appendages. Arguably, this repre-
sents the liberal democratic role of Radio Okapi in the 
DRC. By mediating objective realities of ongoing events 
and subjective realities purveyed by political elites, Dia-
logue provides elites a raw forum to criticise policy de-
cisions and to comment on other issues of popular 
concern while also affording citizens an opportunity to 
participate in the questioning, evaluation and interpre-
tation processes.  
Despite its good work however, Radio Okapi has 
had an immensely difficult time in the DRC, with two of 
its journalists killed3 and several others intimidated by 
armed gangs4. In the eastern region of the country, Ra-
dio Okapi has faced the ever–present allochtho-
ny/autochthony (foreigner /local) crises in terms of 
questions of foreign content and ownership in a region 
                                                          
3 Radio Okapi Journalist Didace Namujimbo was shot dead in 
Bukavu in November 2008 by unknown gunmen, 17 months af-
ter another Radio Okapi Journalist Serge Maheshe was also 
killed in Bukavu. 
4 The most recent being the brutal beating on August 7 2009 of 
Paulin Munanga, Radio Okapi’s Provincial correspondent in Lu-
bumbashi by security agents of Agence Nationale des Rensei-
gnements, (ANR) while covering a demonstration by human 
rights activists in Katanga. 
where citizenship and nationality are contested issues. 
Though the station has an array of programmes aimed 
at various networks and actors in the DRC conflict, 
there is the potential risk of a crisis of message—what 
message for whom and with what effects on other 
groups? Besides, although, Radio Okapi is directly run 
by Swiss based Hirondelle Foundation, it is joined at 
the hip with the UN and is subject to reservations local 
folks have about UN peacekeepers. In its over 10 years 
in the DRC, the UN has had to deal with various con-
troversies regarding its Peacekeepers—ranging from 
accusations of rape, arms dealing, trade in conflict di-
amonds and coltan, to negation of their responsibility 
to protect civilians under threat of violence.  
Contemporary works on Information Intervention 
have tended to concentrate on rationalising interven-
tion. There have been far lesser studies on the nature 
of intervention, the framework for intervention and 
the composition of interveners. Krug and Price (2002) 
have made a compelling case for and proposed a mod-
ule that can be generically applied in post-conflict set-
tings. But their module is focused primarily on regula-
tory frameworks and issues of governmentality, media 
reform and governance.  
This work extends the frontiers of the discussion by 
exploring, not only the actual contents of intervention 
media but also the impacts of specific contents on 
groups in societies violently divided along ethnic cleav-
ages. Today, Information Intervention and Public Di-
plomacy activities by foreign states, NGOs and IGOs as 
a tool for Peacebuilding or preventing genocide have 
become normatively acceptable in the international 
community. For example, in 2009 the UN Support Of-
fice for AMISOM (UNSOA) in Somalia outsourced a ma-
jor PIO component to a communication consulting con-
sortium after an openly advertised bidding process 
which drew tenders from NGOs including Hirondelle 
Foundation. While various factors determine the out-
come of UN procurement processes, the UN’s decision 
to award the contract to a private consulting consortium 
is instructive. If anything, it suggests that the UN is be-
coming more confident with its new outsourcing of pub-
lic information components. Part of the UNSOA out-
sourcing deal, is a Radio component—Radio Bar-Kulan 
which is run by Okapi Consulting—a member of the con-
sortium5. Along this trajectory, this study moves the de-
bates from questions of legitimacy of media intervention 
to questions of who should intervene as well as the na-
ture and effectiveness of specific media intervention 
contents and their impacts in real world settings.  
Furthermore, the methodological approach used in 
the study moves the debates beyond prediction mod-
els and/or retrospective rationalisations frequently 
                                                          
5 Okapi Consulting has nothing to do with Radio Okapi. It is a 
South African-based private consulting company headed by 
David Smith, former MONUC’s Chief of Public Information. 
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used in media impact evaluation processes of this na-
ture. The research was designed bearing in mind the af-
finity for narratives and story–telling of the communities 
researched. It was built on real time, real world subjects 
and contexts involving working with real people within 
real contexts of an ongoing conflict setting—intact with 
emotions of fear, anger and guilt as well as rumours and 
other socially transmitted information which have po-
tentials of affecting audience engagements.  
Findings provide instruments with which opera-
tional researchers or media intervention practitioners 
can compare predictions and rationalise impacts as 
they happen, in future conflicts. Furthermore findings 
have implications on contemporary understanding of 
the relative importance of communication models and 
their interactions within conflict settings where the 
media is used as a tool for violence or for transfor-
mation and Peacebuilding.  
The implication of findings in this study is that con-
tents for African audiences need to draw and build on 
the rich oral traditions and traditionally transactional 
processes of information and meaning sharing. Such 
contents should first map existing narratives to identify 
conflicting messages. Secondly, explore using participa-
tory processes, new narratives that transcend historical 
realities within which conflict parties weave their nar-
ratives. Thirdly, design the new narratives within an in-
teractive framework that engages with and challenges 
conflicting ones.  
Information intervention is a concept worthy of con-
tinued debates. Within the realm of Public Diplomacy, 
information intervention figures prominently, not as an 
appendage for explaining mandates or rationalising an 
intervention, but as a virile tool for stimulating public 
debates on the common good. And within military 
spheres of psyops, information intervention figures, not 
only as a force multiplier but as a key component of 
strategy. This study emphasises the need to keep the 
approaches that underlie both doctrines far apart par-
ticularly during the post–conflict reconstruction phase.  
In summary, findings of this study show that in vio-
lently divided societies, Information Intervention ap-
proaches aimed at achieving attitudinal and/or behav-
ioural change by appealing to social norms can be 
ineffective if not counter–productive. But an informa-
tive approach involving the use of narratives that stim-
ulate discursive discussions on the common good, a 
collectively imagined future and issues of good govern-
ance can open up a sphere for participation, social in-
teraction and civic engagement.  
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